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This section of the Journal provides notes on recent cases, pending or
newly-enacted legislation, and other current legal materials. The Updates
section is designed to aid the practitioner in relating the Journal articles to
the daily practice of labor and employment law. The Journal welcomes
outside submissions of brief judicial and legislative summaries.
Court holds that a union rule limiting eligibility for local office to
union members who have attended at least eight of their local's monthly
meetings in the previous two years is unreasonable and invalid. Herman v.
Local 1011, United Steelworkers of America, No. 99-3146, 2000 U.S. App.
LEXIS 4501 (7th Cir. Mar. 23, 2000).
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that a rule in
the United Steelworkers constitution that limited those eligible for local
office to union members who have attended at least eight of their local's
monthly meetings in the last two years was unreasonable and invalid. The
Appeals Court upheld a summary judgment ruling by the lower court in
favor of the Department of Labor.
Under § 401 of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act
of 1959, all union members are eligible to run for office subject to
"reasonable qualifications." The Appeals Court held that the constitutional
restriction was unreasonable. The court cited the union's failure to show
that the rule was supported by compelling need and was not burdensome.
Judge Richard A. Posner wrote that "the proper approach, and one that
is consistent with the case law... is to deem a condition of eligibility that
disqualifies the vast bulk of the union's membership from standing for
union office presumptively unreasonable. The union must then present
convincing reasons, not merely conjectures, why the condition is either not
burdensome or though burdensome is supported by compelling need."
Court holds that plaintiffs who have raised claims under Title VII of
the 1964 Civil Rights Act under the "pretext" standard of causation do not
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have the right to seek jury instructions under the "mixed-motive" standard
of causation. Watson v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., Nos. 98-1832, 98-
1833, and 98-1834, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 4342 (3d Cir. Mar. 20, 2000).
During trial, plaintiff challenged the court's standard jury instruction
regarding her sex discrimination claim. Plaintiff argued that the 1991 Civil
Rights Act's amendment to the 1964 Civil Rights Act eliminated the
distinction between the standards of causation for pretext and mixed-
motive cases. The trial court disagreed.
According to the court, in a pretext case, the plaintiff must show that
an illegitimate consideration was the determinative factor in a decision. In
a mixed-motive case, on the other hand, the plaintiff must show that an
illegitimate consideration was a "substantial motivating factor" in an
employer's adverse decision.
In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, the Supreme Court held that in a
mixed-motive case, an employer is not liable if it can show it would have
taken the adverse action even in the absence of discriminatory animus. The
Civil Rights Act of 1991 was enacted in order to limit the Supreme Court's
decision. Section 107(a) of the 1991 Act assigns liability when an
illegitimate factor motivates an adverse employment action.
The trial court in the Watson case gave a trial instruction that plaintiff
must show that "but for plaintiffs sex, the adverse employment action
would not have occurred." The trial court held that the 1991 Act did not
counteract the second holding in the Price Waterhouse case that the shift in
burden of proof to the employer only occurs if the plaintiff demonstrates
with "sufficiently direct" evidence that an impermissible factor was a
motivating factor.
The Third Circuit, in the Watson case, held that according to the Price
Waterhouse case, the shift in the burden of proof does not apply to the
pretext cases. The Circuit Court further held that the text of the 1991 Act
"was designed to apply only to Price Waterhouse mixed-motive cases."
Only two other appeals courts have addressed this issue. The holding
of the Third Circuit is in agreement with the holdings of the Second Circuit
in a 1997 case, and the Fourth Circuit in a 1995 case.
Court holds that a former employee is not entitled to an award in
excess of $25 million for intentional misrepresentation which led him to
continue his employment. Mackenzie v. Miller Brewing, No. 97-3542, 2000
U.S. App. LEXIS 156 (Wis. Ct. App. Feb. 22,2000).
In Mackenzie v. Miller Brewing, the plaintiff claimed that he was fired
for making remarks to a female coworker about an episode of the television
show "Seinfeld." At the trial there was testimony that the plaintiff was
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fired after repeatedly making unwelcome remarks to a coworker about
sexual innuendo on which the Seinfeld episode was based. Despite the
media attention and the case widely being referred to as the "Seinfeld
case," neither the jury award nor the appeals court decision turned on the
"Seinfeld" aspect.
The plaintiffs suit claimed wrongful termination and intentional
misrepresentation. While the claim for wrongful termination was
dismissed at an early point, the plaintiffs jury verdict was based on the
claim that the company misled him by not disclosing a change in his job's
grade level classification, which is used by the employer to determine
seniority.
The Appeals Court stated that for the plaintiff to prevail he must show
that he justifiably relied on a misrepresentation of fact. The court reversed
the jury award because the plaintiff offered no evidence of a causal
connection between the misrepresentation and his alleged damages or that
plaintiff was intentionally misled by defendant's failure to disclose that his
job classification's grade level had been changed.
The federal government agrees to pay $508 million to a class of more
than 1,100 women alleging denial ofjobs based on their gender.
The Department of Justice announced a settlement of $508 million
with a class of over 1,100 women alleging that the Voice of America and
U.S. Information Agency denied them jobs on the basis of their gender.
The gender bias suit was initially filed in 1977. According to civil rights
litigators, the settlement is the highest dollar amount paid by a
discrimination defendant under the 1964 Civil Rights Act.
The lead plaintiff, Carolee Brady, nee Hartman, initially filed the suit
after being told that she would not be hired for the position of magazine
editor because she was not a man. The class alleged that the government
deliberately excluded women from consideration for several occupations.
Allegations included rigging tests to ensure that certain male candidates
were hired, selecting males who failed tests over women who passed the
same tests, and destruction of test files to cover up the discrimination.
The trial court's initial finding of liability occurred in 1984. The
government lost appeals and review was denied by the U.S. Supreme Court
in 1997.
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